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INTRODUCTION 
The long Afghan conflict has resulted in an extensive destruction of Afghanistan’s state 
justice institutions that existed prior to the former USSR invasion of the country in December 
1979. The destruction has not only included extensive damage to buildings, office furniture, 
official records, legal resources, and essential office equipment, but it has also included the death, 
imprisonment and migration of hundreds of professional justice officials, including qualified 
judges, prosecutors, police officers, and prison wardens.1  Following the collapse of the Taliban 
regime, the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 authorized formation of the Afghanistan Judicial 
Commission.2  The Bonn Agreement tasked the Commission—with help from the United Nations 
and other international actors—to “rebuild the [Afghan] domestic justice system in accordance 
with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.”3  The 
Commission, however, which lacked both vision and competence, had difficulty drawing up a 
roadmap for rebuilding the post-Taliban justice system and working collaboratively with 
permanent Afghan justice institutions.4  This situation has had important negative implications for the 
                                                          
* Dr. Ali Wardak is a Reader (Associate Professor) in criminology at the University of Glamorgan, United Kingdom, and 
Vice President of the South Asian Society of Criminology and Victimology.  I can be reached by email 
at awardak@glam.ac.uk.  I extend my sincere thanks to John Braitwaite, Amy Feinman and the staffs of the Journal of 
International Law and the Journal of Law and Social Change at the University of Pennsylvania for their very 
helpful comments on earlier versions of the Article.  My heartfelt thanks also go to my wife, Safora, and to our children—
Omar, Zohra, and Hossai—for their affectionate support while working on this Article.  An earlier version of this Article 
was presented by the author at “The Afghanisation Strategy,” a seminar organized by Casa Asia in Barcelona, Spain on 
June 15, 2009. 
1 Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 J. OF CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE
319, 328 (2004) [hereinafter Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System]. 
2 See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. SCOR, 4434th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html [hereinafter Bonn Agreement]. 
3 Id. at 4.
4 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International 
Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1212 (Dec. 30, 
2003); see also Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System, supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties of working with 
Afghan institutions to establish a cohesive justice system). 
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process of rebuilding a post-Taliban justice system in Afghanistan over the past ten years. 
Afghanistan’s post-Taliban administrations, supported by, among others, the United 
Nations, Italy, the United States, Germany, and Canada, embarked on the complex task of 
rebuilding Afghanistan’s rule of law and justice institutions.  The various national and 
international efforts in this process are guided by several strategies, which mainly include the 
2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the National Justice Sector Strategy, National 
Justice Program, and the 2010 Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and 
Implementation Plan.5  While overlapping, these strategies provide guidance to the Afghan 
government’s rule of law and justice implementation program, as well a framework for 
international donor support.6  Key objectives of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy that 
were to be accomplished by the end of 2010 included completion of the basic legal framework 
(including civil, criminal, and commercial law), rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure of 
justice institutions, establishment of fully functional justice institutions throughout Afghanistan, 
review and reform of oversight of corruption-related procedures addressing lack of due process 
and miscarriages of justice, and strengthening the professionalism, credibility, and integrity of the 
justice system personnel.7
This paper argues that a post-Taliban justice system, built on a meaningful synergy 
between state and non-state justice institutions, has a very strong potential for providing 
accessible, effective, cost-effective and transparent justice to all sections of the Afghan society.  
The paper is divided into three sections.  Section I examines the achievements as well as the 
problems that have surfaced throughout the process of rebuilding Afghanistan’s state justice 
institutions over the past ten years.  Section II discusses non-state justice institutions, focusing on 
jirga and shura.  After examining positive aspects of jirga and shura, the negative aspects of 
these non-state institutions of local dispute settlement are highlighted.  In Section III, this paper 
focuses on the “hybrid model of Afghan justice,” which was proposed by the 2007 Afghanistan 
Human Development Report.8  The “hybrid model” recommends the creation of meaningful 
institutional links between state and non-state justice systems in Afghanistan.  The paper 
concludes by proposing that a post-Taliban justice system that is built on the basis of a 
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice institutions has a strong potential to 
provide accessible, effective, cost-effective and transparent justice to all sections of Afghan 
society.  This would, in turn, provide important channels of communication, trust, and 
collaboration among ordinary citizens and their state in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
                                                          
5 See generally LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41484, AFGHANISTAN: U.S. RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE (2010) (explaining generally the 
international reform efforts in Afghanistan). 
6 Id. at 17. 
7 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, AFGHANISTAN 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1387, MAKING A DIFFERENCE: TRANSITION FROM 
PLANNING TO PRACTICE 10 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09319.pdf [hereinafter 
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY]. 
8 CENTRE FOR POLICY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT,
BRIDGING MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 4 (2007), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ nationalreports/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf 
[hereinafter AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
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I. STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Although it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between state and non-state justice 
systems in Afghanistan, the former generally refers to positive law that functions through legal 
codes and state institutions, such as the courts, prosecutors, police, the prison service, and the bar 
of law.  Thus, in the context of Afghanistan, key state justice and judicial institutions include the 
Supreme Court (stara mahkama), the Attorney General’s Office (loy saranwali), the police 
(sarandoi), the Ministry of Justice (wezarate-e-adelia), and the prison service.  Although these 
institutions are supposed to be closely interconnected, in reality there exists little organic chain-
like interaction among them, and therefore, they hardly operate as a “system.”9  Nevertheless, the 
totality of these justice institutions has historically been referred to as a nezam-e-adlee wa qazaiee
(justice and judicial order/system), which was central to the maintenance of social and political 
order in pre-war Afghanistan. 
While progress in rebuilding the Afghan state justice system during the past ten years has 
been slow and patchy, it has nevertheless been noticeable: significant work has been done on 
legislation; several hundred judges, prosecutors, and prison wardens, and thousands of police 
personnel have been trained; some justice institutions have been refurbished; and several new 
ones have been built from scratch.10  Progress has also been made with regard to building 
administrative capacity within the existing justice institutions and the publication and distribution 
of a large body of law to legal professionals.11 Progress in rebuilding Afghanistan’s state justice 
system has included the establishment of the Independent Bar Association of Afghanistan, legal 
aid departments in Kabul and in three provinces, the Independent National Legal Training Centre 
(INLTC) in Kabul, and a committee for the simplification of judicial bureaucracy.12 Moreover, 
there has been an agreement between the Attorney General and Ministry of Interior on the 
development and implementation of measures to improve prosecution processes, and the 
introduction of common telephone numbers for use by the public to register complaints.13
However despite the above-mentioned achievements, the post-Taliban state justice 
system is far from delivering justice to the Afghan people and faces serious problems.  The nature 
and severity of these problems appear to have heavily overshadowed what has been achieved thus 
far.  These problems include endemic corruption, high levels of professional incompetence, 
inadequacy of physical infrastructure such as courtrooms and detention/correctional facilities, 
very low levels of public trust, and the provision of minimal international funding for the 
rebuilding of justice and rule of law institutions in post-Taliban Afghanistan.14  Due to the United 
                                                          
9 See Ali Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview, in 4 PETERSBERG PAPERS ON 
AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION 47 (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2009) [hereinafter Wardak, Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan] (explaining the development of Afghan political and judicial institutions). See generally AFGHANISTAN 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 (discussing generally the social developments in Afghanistan); CHRIS 
JOHNSON ET AL., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4810.pdf (discussing generally the lack of cohesiveness among Afghan 
institutions). 
10 See generally AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 7. 
11 Id.
12 Id. at 33.
13 Id.
14 See generally STEPHEN CARTER & KATE CLARK, NO SHORTCUT TO STABILITY: JUSTICE, POLITICS,
AND INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN (2010), http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/18074_1210pr_afghanjustice.pdf
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States’ overemphasis on the “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan, the issue of rebuilding justice and 
rule of law institutions has, until recent years, been largely neglected.  According to Lakhdar 
Brahimi, “The international community, including the United Nations is just starting to pay enough 
attention to rule-of-law issues.  In Afghanistan, the judicial reform process was largely neglected, and I 
must confess that I personally bear a large part of responsibility for that.”15  This observation, 
particularly the allocation of insufficient funds to reforming and rebuilding justice and rule of law 
institutions until recent years, is illustrated in Figure 1, below. 
FIGURE 1: U.S. CIVILIAN FUNDING FOR AFGHAN ROL ASSISTANCE FY 2002 - FY 2010 AND 
FINANCIAL 2011 REQUEST16
Figure 1, above, indicates that assistance from the United States to Afghan justice and rule 
of law institutions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 was only seven million and eight million dollars 
respectively; the total of this assistance from fiscal years 2002 through 2007 did not exceed $160 
million.  It was only from fiscal year 2008 on that there was a significant increase in assistance to 
Afghan justice and rule of law institutions, which peaked in 2010.  Some of the problems that 
Afghanistan’s justice system currently faces, particularly the lack of sufficient professional, 
human, and legal resources, inadequacy of physical infrastructure, and low salaries for justice 
officials, could be directly traced to the very low level of investment in this sector. 
Other than insufficient investment in the justice sector, national and international efforts 
have primarily focused on strengthening the pre-war state justice institutions in Afghanistan—
they have mainly focused on patchy “legal engineering” and quick-fixes, and on meeting targets 
and the technical aspects of reform at the expense of its normative dimensions. 17 Different donor 
(discussing the fundamental role of justice to stability in Afghanistan); WYLER & KATZMAN, supra note 5, at 5 (describing 
public perceptions of corruption in Afghanistan). 
15 LAKHDAR BRAHIMI, 7TH GLOBAL FORUM ON REINVENTING GOVERNMENT BUILDING TRUST IN 
GOVERNMENT, STATE BUILDING IN CRISIS AND POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 15 (2007), available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf. 
16 WYLER & KATZMAN, Supra note 5, at 27. 
17 See generally Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, supra note 9 (explaining the development of 
Afghan political and judicial institutions); Astri Suhrke & Kaja Borchgrevink, Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss4/3
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countries concentrated on different aspects of the justice sector without effective coordination 
among them and with the Afghan state institutions.18  This situation also seems to have resulted in 
the continued absence of a coherent vision for rebuilding and reforming the justice sector in 
Afghanistan. The outcome has been a fragmented justice “system,” the key components of which 
(the judiciary, police, prosecution, and prison service) do not operate as a system at all.19  All 
these problems, combined with a growing insurgency and persistent institutionalized corruption, 
have further complicated the task of rebuilding an effective justice system in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan. 
The most serious among the problems which Afghanistan’s justice (and many other 
state) institutions face is corruption.  Although corruption in the Afghan justice system is not a 
new phenomenon,20 recent studies reveal a much gloomier picture.  A 2010 United Nations Office 
on Drug and Crime (UNDP) survey reveals that in 2009, Afghans paid around $ 2.5 billion U.S. 
dollars in bribes—a figure equivalent to twenty-three percent of the Afghanistan’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).21  The survey, which is based on real experiences of Afghan men and women (in 
both urban and rural areas), reveals that judicial and criminal justice officials topped those public 
officials who took bribes during 2009.22  This picture is illustrated in Figure 2, below. 
                                                          
Afghanistan, 51 J. OF CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 211 (2008) (discussing the post-2001 justice sector reforms in 
Afghanistan); CARTER & CLARK, supra note 14 (suggesting that aiming for rigid short-term solutions to problems 
plaguing Afghanistan’s justice system will undermine its long-term stability). 
18 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8; Wardak, Rule of Law 
in Afghanistan, supra note 9 (detailing a lack of communication between Afghanistan and its international partners in 
redeveloping Afghanistan’s justice system). 
19 See Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan, supra note 9 (discussing the absence of a broader 
institutional framework to coordinate different parts of Afghanistan’s developing justice system); see also JOHNSON ET 
AL., Supra note 9 (discussing generally the lack of cohesiveness among Afghan institutions).  See generally AFGHANISTAN 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8. 
20 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 60-64; see also Wardak, Building
a Post-War Justice System, supra note 1 (discussing the history and development of corruption in the Afghan justice 
system). 
21 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG AND CRIME, CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY AS 
REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 25 (2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/ 
Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf. 
22 Id.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
WARDAK_FINAL[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2012 8:38 PM 
416 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 14 
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGES OF ADULT POPULATION WHO PAID BRIBES AFTER CONTACT 
WITH SELECTED TYPES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, BY TYPE OF OFFICIAL AND URBAN/RURAL AREAS23
Figure 2, above, reveals that urban area police officers, custom officers, judges, and 
municipal officials ranked highest (respectively) in the receipt of bribes.  And in rural areas, 
prosecutors, judges, custom officers, and police officers ranked highest (respectively) in the 
receipt of bribes.  What is important to notice is that, in both urban and rural areas, it is mainly 
judicial and criminal justice officials who are seen as the most corrupt public officials, and it is 
these same officials who are entrusted with upholding the law.  The 2010 Integrity Watch 
Afghanistan (IWA) survey reached a very similar conclusion: 
The survey indicates that Afghans perceive the main institutions responsible for 
security and justice as the most corrupt.  42% of the respondents consider the 
Ministry of Interior to be the most corrupt, while the Ministry of Justice and the 
Directorate of National Security are perceived as the most corrupt by 32% and 
30 %, respectively.  Moreover, households paid the highest numbers of bribes 
for the provision of security and justice by the police and the courts.24
In response to endemic and widespread official corruption, the Afghan government—with the 
support of the international community—has devised various anti-corruption strategies and bodies 
during the past six years.  The most important of these is the creation of the High Office for 
Oversight for the Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2008.25  The new body, 
which is referred to as the High Office for Oversight (HOO), has devised an ambitious agenda for 
its activities.  To date, HOO and some key relevant ministries and state institutions have taken 
important practical steps in the right direction, including the simplification of bureaucratic 
23 Id.
24 INTEGRITY WATCH AFGHANISTAN, AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION: A
NATIONAL SURVEY 11 (2010), available at http://www.iwaweb.org/ Reports/PDF/IWA%20corruption%
20survey%202010.pdf. 
25 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR), TENTH 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 108 (2011) [hereinafter SIGAR REPORT]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol14/iss4/3
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systems in some government institutions, and the creation of a specialized anti-corruption
criminal unit.  While HOO and its initiatives appear promising, the January 2011 Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Report to the U.S. Congress says that, 
“In an audit report released in December 2009, SIGAR found that the HOO suffered from a 
limited operational capacity.  The audit also found that the organization lacked the independence 
required to meet international standards for an oversight institution . . . .”26  Indeed as a young 
institution operating in very difficult circumstances, HOO has a long way to go.  In order to 
become an effective and independent institution, HOO will need strong financial and professional 
support from both national and international agencies in the years to come. 
Afghan anti-corruption initiatives do not seem to have had a noticeable impact on 
reducing corruption in the country, or on changing its perception among Afghan population.  The 
2010 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks Afghanistan jointly with
Myanmar as 176th out of 178 countries—making it the second most corrupt country in the 
world.27  All this would seem to indicate that the Afghan government has failed to implement its 
anti-corruption strategies and initiatives.  One of the main reasons for this failure is that the 
Afghan government has been very reluctant to take decisive actions against high ranking officials 
suspected or accused of corruption.  Corruption investigations against high-ranking government 
officials have been repeatedly blocked, and honest anti-corruption officials have been demoted or 
fired.  According to a New York Times report, on August 28, 2010 Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar—the 
former deputy attorney general of Afghanistan—was sacked after he repeatedly refused to block 
corruption investigations against high-ranking government officials.28  The article adds that: 
The dispute began last year, Mr. Faqiryar said, when he went before the Afghan 
Parliament and read aloud the names of at least 25 Afghan officials who were 
under investigation for corruption. The list included some of the most senior 
officials in Mr. Karzai’s government, including Mohammed Siddiq Chakari, the 
former minister for hajj and Islamic affairs, and Rangin Spanta, who is now the 
national security adviser.29
Similarly, high-ranking officials within the justice and rule of law institutions are hardly ever 
investigated and/or sanctioned for corruption, although several dozen judges and other judicial 
officials have been punished for corruption recently.30  However, there is no evidence indicating 
that those who are punished include high-ranking judicial officials.31  This situation goes directly 
against a key principle of the idea of rule of law—accountability of all citizens before the law, and 
the equal enforcement of laws.  However, the immunity of those with political power and money 
from accountability is likely to result in the persistence and institutionalization of corruption.  
This indeed seems to be the case in Afghanistan today. 
As will be examined in the next section, persistent corruption within the state justice 
                                                          
26 Id. at 109. 
27 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS 
INDEX 2 (2010). 
28 Dexter Filkins & Alissa Rubin, Graft-Fighting Prosecutor Fired in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/ asia/29afghan.html. 
29 Id.
30 CARTER & CLARK, supra note 14, at 32.
31 Id. at 33. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
WARDAK_FINAL[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2012 8:38 PM 
418 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 14 
institutions has not only weakened trust in them, but has also driven many Afghans to take their 
disputes to the Taliban for resolution, where the Taliban courts are “the only effective and trusted 
tribunals of justice.  Above all, unlike the state courts, ‘their decisions are not dependent on the 
ability to pay bribes and will be enforced.”32  However, the Taliban’s courts operate only in the areas 
that they control, or where they enjoy significant support.  In many other parts of the country, most 
Afghans continue to take their disputes to non-state local justice institutions for resolution.33
II. NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As mentioned in the previous section, the overwhelming majority of disputes in 
Afghanistan are resolved outside the state justice system.  They are resolved by community or 
village-based local institutions and processes, which operate even less as a “system” than the state 
justice “system.”  Although these local institutions and processes may interact with state justice 
institutions in different contexts and to varying degrees, the interaction occurs outside of a 
regulated framework.34  The most important non-state institutions in Afghanistan are jirga and
shura.  The particular form and composition of a jirga or shura are determined by the nature of a 
dispute at hand, but typically by a body of respected marakachian or rishsafidan (local elders and 
leaders) who refer to customary laws in order to reach a settlement that is acceptable to disputants 
and to the community.  Jirga and shura address issues ranging from minor bodily harm and 
agricultural land boundaries to serious and sometimes violent conflicts concerning communal 
lands and murder. 
Jirgas and shuras place strong emphasis on reconciliation and making peace among 
disputants.  Thus, unlike the state justice system, which creates losers and winners, jirgas and 
shuras reach community-led decisions that promote restorative justice (as opposed to retributive 
justice), and help to restore peace and dignity among the victims, offenders, and the community.35
These local Afghan institutions also aim to reintegrate offenders back into the community after 
holding them accountable for a wrongdoing.36  As a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
these practices can also reduce strain on a capacity-deficient state justice system.37  In addition, 
jirgas and shuras are shown to be more accessible, more efficient (in terms of time and money), 
perceived as less corrupt, and more trusted by Afghans compared to formal state courts.38  A more 
                                                          
32 Frank Ledwidge, Justice and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan: A Missing  Link , 154 THE 
RUSI J. 6, 7 (2009).
33 Id. at 8. 
34 NOAH COBURN & JOHN DEMPSEY, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, INFORMAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr247_0.pdf.  See generally 
AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT (AREU), COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN 
NANGARHAR PROVINCE (2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b3870cf2.html [hereinafter 
COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES] (discussing community-based dispute resolution in Afghanistan). 
35 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3; see also AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
supra note 8, at 10. 
36 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3. 
37 Id. at 2-3. 
38 Id. at 2; see, e.g., THE ASIA FOUNDATION, AFGHANISTAN IN 2010: A SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN 
PEOPLE 134 (2010), available at http://asiafoundation.org/resources/ pdfs/Afghanistanin2010survey.pdf [hereinafter ASIA 
FOUNDATION]; see also Wardak, Building a Post War Justice System, supra note 1. 
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recent national survey by the Asia Foundation strongly confirms these findings.39  Figure 3, 
below, compares respondents’ perceptions of state courts and local shura and jirga with regard to 
five key issues. 
FIGURE 3: PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS WHO AGREE (STRONGLY AGREE AND SOMEWHAT AGREE) WITH FIVE STATEMENTS 
RELATED TO STATE COURTS AND JIRGA AND SHURA40
Figure 3, above, illustrates that jirga and shura are perceived by respondents to be 
performing better than State justice institutions.  These non-state institutions are shown to be 
more accessible, more trusted, in accord with accepted local norms, more effective, less corrupt, 
and more prompt in the resolution of disputes than state courts. These results would seem to 
indicate that most Afghans continue to perceive non-state justice institutions more positively than 
state courts.  However, male elders (rishsafidan/marakachian) usually dominate gatherings of
jirgas and shuras, and women are largely excluded from participation in the decision-making of 
these bodies as Figure 4, below illustrates. 
FIGURE 4: REPRESENTATION AT LOCAL JIRGAS AND SHURAS41
                                                          
39 ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 38, at 134. 
40 Id.
41 For a partial representation of this data, see AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 98-99 (2007). The Centre for Policy and Human Development survey was commissioned by the UNDP-
supported Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD), Kabul University, and was carried out by ACSOR in 
February 2007.  The survey’s sample consisted of 2339 men and women, which covered thirty-two out of Afghanistan’s 
thirty-four provinces. The full dataset from this survey is on file with the second author, to whom any questions can be 
directed. 
Strongly Agree and  
Somewhat Agree
State Courts (%) Jirgas and Shuras
(%)
Are accessible to me 73 86 
Are fair and trusted 53 73 
Follow the local norms and values 
of our people 51 70 
Are effective at delivering justice 54 69 
Resolve cases timely and promptly 42 66 
How frequently are people from various community groups present at a village- or  
neighbourhood-based Jirga or Shura?
(Values given in percentages based on a sample size of 2339 individuals) 
Always Sometimes Rarely Never Don’t Know Refused 
Ordinary elders 
(Rishsafidan) 65 25 7 3 1 * 
Mullahs 36 43 15 6 1 * 
Local leaders 
(Khan or Malik) 31 36 22 9 2 * 
Commanders 12 25 34 26 3 1 
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As Figure 4, above, illustrates, two-thirds of respondents said that ordinary elders 
(rishsafidan) were always represented on the jirga or shura, and another quarter said that they 
were sometimes represented.  A third of the individuals surveyed said that mullahs were always 
represented, and more than a third said that they were sometimes represented.  There was a 
similar response regarding local leaders (Khan or Malik). Commanders were much less likely to 
be represented on local jirgas or shuras. More importantly, these data indicate that women had 
the least representation in jirgas and shuras: only eight percent of the respondents said that 
women were always or sometimes represented in jirgas or shuras.  This confirms—as in most 
other spheres of life in Afghan society—that women are largely excluded from the structure and 
processes of jirgas and suhras. This situation not only has serious implications for gender equality 
within these local institutions of dispute settlement, but for the actual delivery of justice to women 
at a local level. 
Another serious problem is that some settlements made by jirgas and shuras may include 
baad—the practice of offering a woman into marriage as a means of dispute settlement.  This 
practice violates Afghan state laws, shari’a, and fundamental human rights.42  Although recent 
field studies reveal that the practice of baad is increasingly rare, even among Pashtuns in eastern 
Afghanistan,43 its mere occurrence has serious implications for the human rights of women in 
Afghan society, and for their fundamental freedoms.  However, it is important to recognize that 
baad and the exclusion of women from participation in jirgas and shuras are not inherent 
characteristics of these non-state justice institutions; they are the characteristics of Afghan 
patriarchal society.  According to a recent field study: 
Women’s access to these [community-based dispute resolution] processes and 
participation in them is constrained and at times decisions are made which do 
not uphold women’s human rights.  However, this is not an outcome of 
community-based dispute resolution or customary law itself, but is instead a 
consequence of prevailing gender roles and relations in Afghanistan more 
widely.44
Indeed, women’s rights are widely violated in Afghan society, and the state justice system does 
                                                          
42 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 (exploring the 
importance of rule of law to human development); Ali Wardak, Jirga: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in 
Afghanistan in LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO 187-204 (John Strawson ed., Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 2002) (exploring the 
institution of jirga as a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan); Ali Wardak, Structures of Authority 
and Local Dispute Settlement in Afghanistan in CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES:
BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY 347-370 (Hans-Jörg Albrecht et al. eds., Duncker & Humblot 2006) (discussing 
structures of authority and local dispute settlement in Afghanistan); Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System, supra
note 1 (examining sharia, jurga, the Afghan interim legal framework, and human rights principles). 
43 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW 
STABILIZATION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (INFORMAL COMPONENT) 21 (2011); see also COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34. 
44 COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34, at 4. 
Women 2 6 21 67 3 1 
Other  2 3 5 9 81 1 
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not fare better than non-state justice institutions.45  Furthermore, it is important to point out that 
women’s access to the state justice system, where approximately three percent of the judges,46 and 
less than once percent of police personnel are women, 47 is severely limited.  Another problem 
with non-state justice institutions is that in some parts of Afghanistan jirgas and shuras are 
influenced by local strong men and warlords, and, therefore, may produce biased and unfair 
outcomes.48  However, other studies indicate that  because many local strong men and warlords 
have been appointed to key government positions in recent years, their influence over jirgas and 
shuras has significantly been reduced in rural areas.49  Nevertheless, like the state justice 
institutions, jirgas and shuras also have serious problems in resolving local disputes transparently. 
These problems need to be addressed in imaginative and prudent ways. 
III. THE NEED FOR SYNERGY 
What has been examined in the previous two sections of this paper indicates that both 
state and non-state justice “systems” in Afghanistan have serious problems in delivering justice to 
the Afghan people.  This examination indicates that Afghanistan needs a new coherent “Afghan” 
vision for re-building a post-Taliban justice system—a vision that is deeply rooted in Afghan 
culture and society, and is capable of meeting the new complex needs of the Afghan population 
effectively, cost-effectively, and in humane ways.  The new vision should be capable of 
envisaging a sustainable justice system that bridges Afghan cultural and religious values into 
modern ideas about justice and its delivery in post-Taliban Afghanistan.  Such a vision—in terms 
of a meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice—is proposed by the 2007 UNDP-
supported Afghanistan Human Development Report.50  This vision is formulated in the form of a 
“hybrid model for Afghan justice,” which is illustrated in Figure 5, below. 
                                                          
45 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 4 THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
MONITOR: AFGHANISTAN 6-7 (2010), available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CIGI-SSR-
Afghanistan-September2010.pdf. 
46 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. 
47 Id. at 83.
48 FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL FAMINE CENTER, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, HUMAN SECURITY AND 
LIVELIHOOD OF RURAL AFGHANS (2002-2003) 7 (2004), available at http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/ 
Mazurana2.pdf. 
49 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 97-98. 
50 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 (proposing a hybrid 
model of formal and informal justice). 
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FIGURE 5: HYBRID MODEL FOR AFGHAN JUSTICE51
The “hybrid model” proposes the creation of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and 
Human Rights Units alongside the state justice system at the district level.  The model envisages 
that the ADR Unit would be responsible for selecting appropriate mechanisms to settle disputes 
outside the courtroom.  This would mainly include jirga and shura, but also other appropriate 
civil society organizations such as Community Development Councils (CDCs) that have been 
established by the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Programme in recent years.  ADR 
mechanisms would handle minor criminal offenses52 and civil cases, while giving people a choice 
to have their cases heard at the nearest state court.  All serious criminal cases, on the other hand, 
would fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state justice system. 
According to the “hybrid model,” the proposed Human Rights Unit would be staffed by 
officials from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),53 or from other 
Human Rights and Civil Society bodies in Afghanistan.  In order to counterbalance the 
dominance of men in jirga and shura within the ADR Unit, the Human Rights Unit would be 
staffed by female personnel to the extent feasible.  The Human Rights Unit would be mandated to 
monitor decisions made by ADR bodies in order to ensure their consistency with human rights 
51 Id. at 129. 
52 The existing Penal Code of Afghanistan categorises Ta’zeer offences (acts/omissions that are 
prohibited in Islam, but for which specific punishments are not prescribed under hadd or qisas and diyah) into: jenaiat 
(felonies), jonha (misdemeanours) and qabahat (obscenity).  It is the first category of offenses—punished by death or long 
imprisonments—that are considered as serious crimes.  Most of the other categories are considered less serious offenses. 
53 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has regional offices throughout the 
country.  Through its “Monitoring and Investigation Unit,” the Commission receives and investigates human rights 
violation complaints from the people of Afghanistan. 
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principles.  The Human Rights Unit would also carry out educational and training activities, and 
would examine domestic violence, past human rights abuses, and war crimes. 
In addition to the approval of ADR decisions by the proposed Human Rights Unit, ADR 
decisions would also need to be approved by the district state court, or by a concerned mahkama-
e-shahri (urban court) in Afghan cities.  This is to ensure that ADR decisions do not violate 
Afghan legal norms and/or the fundamental principles of Islamic Shari’a.  The model proposes 
that when ADR decisions fail to be approved by either the Human Rights Unit or the concerned 
state court, they would need to be revised or referred to the state justice system for processing and 
adjudication.  Also, when ADR decisions are not satisfactory to one or both disputants, they can 
be taken back to the formal state justice system for processing and adjudication.  It is important to 
mention that the “hybrid model” does not specify the actual “mechanics” of the interactions 
between the ADR Unit, Human Rights Unit, and the state court, as these are to be decided in 
accordance with the nature and the circumstances of a specific dispute.  This interaction may be 
conducted through formal correspondence, through the participation of representatives from the 
Human Rights Unit and the state court in the final decision making session of the ADR Unit, or 
through other innovative ways. 
The “hybrid model,” which reflects deeply-held Afghan moral and cultural values as 
well as most recent thoughts about contemporary criminology and criminal justice (restorative 
justice), provides a coherent framework for the delivery of effective, cost effective, accessible, 
and speedy justice to the Afghan people.  As an innovative formula synergising state and non-
state justice institutions, the model envisages an Afghan justice system that is less bureaucratic, 
and therefore, less corruptible.  Moreover, since it is deeply rooted in Afghan culture and society, 
the “hybrid model” promises the establishment of a sustainable justice system that is central to the 
“Afghanisation” of rebuilding Afghan state institutions.  Despite an angry and threatening 
response from Afghan judicial and state justice institutions, and the opposition of some Afghan 
women and human rights organizations to the hybrid model, it has created an important debate 
among Afghan and international circles concerned with justice-related issues in Afghanistan.  
However, opposition from some influential Afghan circles had resulted in slowing down 
government policy responses to the recommendations of the 2007 Afghanistan Human 
Development Report and to its proposed “hybrid model of Afghan justice:” 
Although the Afghan government signalled its willingness to engage with 
traditional justice in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy of 2008, 
and again at the London Conference in early 2010, pressure from the human 
rights community and some members of Afghanistan’s legal establishment has 
slowed efforts to codify a clearly defined relationship between formal and 
traditional systems into Afghan law.54
The unhelpful response of Afghanistan’s legal establishment in terms of its perceived vested 
interests may be understandable.  Opposition from some Afghan women and human rights 
organisations—including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)—to 
the “hybrid model” is not fully comprehensible.  One of the key aims of the “hybrid model” is the 
reform of jirga and shura.  As mentioned earlier, a key proposal of the model is that the decision 
made by jirga and shura would only have formally binding effects, when they are in line with 
human right principles, Islamic shari’a and Afghan laws. 
                                                          
54 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, supra note 45, at 11. 
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Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of synergizing state and non-state justice 
systems, the Afghan Ministry of Justice—with the help of the United States Institute on Peace 
(USIP)—drafted a National Policy on Relations Between the Formal Justice System and Dispute 
Resolution Councils.  The draft Policy, which was subjected to weekly discussions by a complex 
“working group” for a very long time, is now drafted as The Law on Dispute Resolution, Shuras 
and Jigras, by the Ministry of Justice.55  However, the draft law, in its current form, severely 
limits the scope of non-state justice institutions and overregulates them. Moreover, it imposes 
unrealistic restrictions on jirga/shura membership and criminalizes non-compliance with 
provisions of this law.  All these have huge negative implications for the flexibility, accessibility, 
local ownership and the “restorative” characteristics of non-state justice institutions.  The draft 
law needs to be debated openly and objectively; it needs to be discussed in the framework of the 
original logic of the “hybrid model,” and in the light of the results of recent empirical research. It 
is important to mention that the ideas derived from the “hybrid model” have been piloted in some 
parts of Afghanistan.  Preliminary results of the pilot studies in selected districts in Afghanistan 
indicate that the “hybrid model” (or the ideas derived from it) provides workable solutions to 
most of the problems that Afghan state and non-state justice systems currently face.56
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper focused on a brief examination of national and international efforts to rebuild 
the justice system in post-Taliban Afghanistan.  As indicated in the paper, progress in the process 
of rebuilding Afghan judicial institutions has been slow, patchy and problematic.  The lack of 
effective coordination among national justice institutions, and between national and international 
actors, lack of a coherent “Afghan” vision, and the focus on reviving the old (pre-civil war) 
justice system with some patchy “legal engineering” seem to be the main contributing factors.  
Furthermore, endemic corruption, high levels of professional incompetence, inadequacy of 
detention/correctional facilities, and, more importantly, a very low level of public trust in the state 
justice system continue to pose serious problems in the rebuilding of judicial institutions in 
Afghanistan.  Thus, the overwhelming majority of the Afghan population continue to take their 
disputes to non-state justice institutions—jirga and shura—for resolution.  Drawing on the 2007 
Afghanistan Human Development Report and on its proposed “hybrid model,” it is maintained 
that creating a meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice and civil society 
institutions within a coherent framework could provide effective, cost-effective, accessible and 
restorative justice to the Afghan population.  Empirical evidence based on recent pilot studies has 
confirmed this. This could, in turn, strengthen the Afghan population’s trust in its justice system 
and in the current national and international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. 
                                                          
55 See Abdul Qadir Siddique, Informal Justice System to Have Legal Cover, PAJHWOK AFGAN NEWS,
Oct. 25 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/10/25/ informal-justice-system-have-legal-cover. 
56 See generally Ali Wardak, A Field Assessment: Linking Formal and Informal Customary Justice 
Mechanisms in Ahmad Aba (Paktia) and Zone 5 of Jalalabad: An Exploratory Project (2010) (unpublished report, on file 
with author) (commenting on a study which demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of a collaboration between the 
informal and formal sectors in Afghanistan); UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43
(documenting the success of a study which sought to increase stability in targeted areas of Afghanistan through 
strengthening the ability of Community-Based Dispute Resolution mechanisms). 
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